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Beyond existence and aiming outside the laboratory: estimating
frequency-dependent and pay-off-biased social learning
strategies
Abstract
The existence of social learning has been confirmed in diverse taxa, from apes to guppies. In order to
advance our understanding of the consequences of social transmission and evolution of behavior,
however, we require statistical tools that can distinguish among diverse social learning strategies. In this
paper, we advance two main ideas. First, social learning is diverse, in the sense that individuals can take
advantage of different kinds of information and combine them in different ways. Examining learning
strategies for different information conditions illuminates the more detailed design of social learning.
We construct and analyze an evolutionary model of diverse social learning heuristics, in order to
generate predictions and illustrate the impact of design differences on an organism's fitness. Second, in
order to eventually escape the laboratory and apply social learning models to natural behavior, we
require statistical methods that do not depend upon tight experimental control. Therefore we examine
strategic social learning in an experimental setting in which the social information itself is endogenous
to the experimental group, as it is in natural settings. We develop statistical models for distinguishing
among different strategic uses of social information. The experimental data strongly suggest most
participants employ a hierarchical strategy that uses both average observed payoffs of options as well as
frequency information, the same model predicted by our evolutionary analysis to dominate a wide range
of conditions.
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Abstract
The existence of social learning has been confirmed in diverse taxa, from apes to
guppies. In order to advance our understanding of the consequences of social trans-
mission and evolution of behavior, however, we require statistical tools that can
distinguish among diverse social learning strategies. In this paper, we advance two
main ideas. First, social learning is diverse, in the sense that individuals can take
advantage of different kinds of information and combine them in different ways.
Examining learning strategies for different information conditions illuminates the
more detailed design of social learning. We construct and analyze an evolutionary
model of diverse social learning heuristics, in order to generate predictions and il-
lustrate the impact of design differences on an organism’s fitness. Second, in order
to eventually escape the laboratory and apply social learning models to natural be-
havior, we require statistical methods that do not depend upon tight experimental
control. Therefore we examine strategic social learning in an experimental setting
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in which the social information itself is endogenous to the experimental group, as it
is in natural settings. We develop statistical models for distinguishing among dif-
ferent strategic uses of social information. The experimental data strongly suggest
most participants employ a hierarchical strategy that uses both average observed
payoffs of options as well as frequency information, the same model predicted by
our evolutionary analysis to dominate a wide range of conditions. KEYWORDS:
Cultural evolution, social learning, quantitative methods.
1 Introduction
Under a broad definition, social learning is common in nature. The behavior
of conspecifics influences individual behavior through modification of the
environment, emulation of goals, and imitation of patterns (c.f. Whiten
and Ham 1992). This psychological set of distinctions has directed years
of research in animal behavior, especially the study of social learning in
non-human apes. Distinguishing between emulation and imitation, and the
interaction of the two (Horner and Whiten 2005), has generated a literature
testifying to the breadth and diversity of social learning in nature (Fragaszy
and Perry 2003).
More recent high-profile experiments with chimpanzees (Whiten et al.
2005, 2007) have demonstrated that short-lived traditions can evolve in chim-
panzee social groups, backing up studies that claim that behavioral variation
among wild populations of chimpanzees are “cultural” (Boesch and Tomasello
1998, Boesch 2003, Whiten et al. 1999). While the finding of short-lived
socially-transmitted traditions may not be surprising to students of Galef’s
rat experiments (Galef and Whiskin 1997), the findings suggest that the time
may be right to attempt a more serious exchange between the evolutionary
anthropology literature on social learning—which emphasizes a toolbox of
social learning strategies, such as majority rule conformity and payoff-biased
learning (Boyd and Richerson 1985, Henrich and McElreath 2003)—and the
animal literature—which tends to emphasize the existence or not of “cul-
ture”.
There are at least two good reasons to try. First, non-human animals
may also have special-purpose social learning strategies that combine and
recombine different kinds of social information, yet usually no effort is made
to look for these (Laland 2004). Finding such cases of analogy (or possi-
bly homology, in the case of other apes) would potentiate advances in the
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general understanding of the evolution of adaptations for processing social
information. Second, many biologists and anthropologists remain skeptical
of the evidence of animal, and especially great ape, “culture” (Laland and
Janik 2006). This is partly a result of the difficulty of inferring patterns
of learning from cross-sections of behavioral variation. However, statistical
tools developed to study dynamic learning in human groups can be leveraged
to study diverse social learning strategies in other animals, as well.
In this paper, we illustrate an approach for analyzing different strategies
for combining social cues from multiple conspecifics, in less poorly controlled
settings. We use a stylized evolutionary model to generate broad predictions
for which of several candidate strategies we expect to find in nature and under
what conditions. We then apply these stylized predictions to a laboratory
experiment that allows participants great flexibility in from whom and how
they learn. Instead of asking if social learning occurs, we develop likelihood
models that allow us to ask how participants socially learn. While the precise
example we present uses very detailed information, the same approach can
be applied to more naturalistic contexts, in which incomplete time series or
purely cross-sectional data is all that is available.
While neither the appreciation of strategic diversity nor our model-based
approach is particularly new in itself, we think the combination is of value.
The key insight is that each social learning strategy implies different out-
comes, under at least some sets of available information, both for each in-
dividual and entire groups of individuals. This is not a new point (Boyd
and Richerson 1985, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981, Galef and Whiskin
1997), but statistical approaches are usually not up to the task of exploring
it adequately. Those who do study distinctions among strategies may be in-
clined to rely upon highly-controlled and artificial experiments. Even when
an experimenter is clever enough to design a series of treatments that can
carefully distinguish among diverse strategies in the lab, scientists will still
debate the lessons of behavior in the wild. In order to resolve animal culture
debates and gain a more detailed behavioral understanding of social learning,
whether in humans or other animals, we will need analytical approaches that
do not require precise experimental control of social information. Another
reason to develop statistical methods for less-controlled contexts is that part
of the action in social learning is evolution of behavior, and experiments that
control social information do not allow us to study these population-level
effects nor how strategies are adapted to them.
The general approach we suggest is to (1) nominate a series of candidate
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social learning strategies; (2) translate each of these into an expression for
the conditional probability of behavior, given an informational context for
an individual animal; (3) use these expressions to generate likelihoods of
observing field or laboratory data; (4) compare the fits of these strategies
to the data with information theoretic criteria, such as Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) or Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Approaching the
problem as a task of discriminating among a toolbox of potential strategies,
rather than a task of demonstrating the existence of social learning, may
allow all of us to squeeze more from both our experiments and field studies
than we previously imagined.
2 Many ways to learn socially
There was a time when biology wondered if natural selection occurred. Now
no one—within evolutionary biology—seriously questions the existence of
natural selection as an evolutionary force. Instead, we debate its relative
strength and character in different environmental and biological contexts.
Both sexual (Kokko et al. 2006) and social selection (Frank 2006) have gen-
erated special literatures of theory and evidence that testify to the subtle
diversity of the action of natural selection. One could seriously say that
there are many natural selections.
In a similar sense, there are many social learnings. Psychologists and
animal behaviorists have long recognized taxonomic distinctions between,
for example, social facilitation and imitation (Zajonc 1965). But many of
the highest profile publications still address basic existence questions, asking
if other animals have human-like social learning and human-like traditions
or culture (Whiten et al. 2005). These publications are probably taking the
right rhetorical approach. Many anthropologists remain unconvinced that
chimpanzee or crow culture is much like human culture (Boesch 2003).
However, many scientists have enough interest in the details of social
learning in humans, as well as other animals, to step aside the “is it hu-
man enough?” debate. As social learning is diverse, it has diverse effects.
Some mechanisms generate rather short-lived traditions, if any at all (Galef
and Whiskin 1997). Human cultural traditions can be both ephemeral and
demonstrate tremendous inertia (Richerson and Boyd 2005), depending in
part upon the strategic diversity of social learning and the details of the so-
cial context (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981, Boyd and Richerson 1992).
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Studying the mechanistic and algorithmic diversity of social learning will be
just as important as arguing that it exists, and our hunch is that most re-
searchers in both anthropology and animal behavior are prepared to move in
this direction.
In this section, we briefly review evolutionary work on structurally differ-
ent social learning strategies. Most of this literature has been concerned with
human social and cultural learning (Boyd and Richerson 1985, Henrich and
McElreath 2003), but there is no reason these models cannot apply to other
organisms (Laland 2004). Before moving on to apply these different strate-
gies to experimental data, we hope to convince the reader that it is worth
asking, for example, if chimpanzees also use majority rule social learning or
are guided by observed cues of others’ success. While no single strategy is
imagined to dominate at all times nor to exist in the absence of individual
learning, the dynamic consequences of each strategy can be appreciated most
easily by first examining them in isolation.
2.1 Unbiased social learning
One of the simplest social learning strategies is to select a random target
individual and copy his or her behavior. We call this kind of social learn-
ing “unbiased”, as it tends to maintain the frequencies of different behavior
(Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981, Boyd and Richerson 1985). One adaptive
advantage of unbiased social learning is economizing on individual learning
costs (Boyd and Richerson 1985).
2.2 Frequency dependent social learning
When individuals can sample more than one conspecific, a large family of
frequency dependent strategies become possible. The most commonly stud-
ied of these is positive frequency dependence, which preferentially copies the
most common behavior variants in the sample. Such a strategy has very
deep intellectual roots, being studied formally at least as far back as 1785,
in Condorcet’s jury theorem (see Estlund 1994). Evolutionary treatments of
positive frequency dependence, “conformity”, emphasize its adaptive value
for individuals (Boyd and Richerson 1985, Henrich and Boyd 1998).
Figure 1, top panel, plots the instantaneous and evolutionary dynamics
of positive frequency dependence. On the left, for any frequency of one of
two alternative learned behaviors on the horizontal axis, the solid curve gives
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the expected frequency (or probability of adoption) after social learning. If
p is the value on the horizontal axis, then p+ p(1− p)(2p− 1) is the value on
the vertical (Boyd and Richerson 1985—we re-derive this function in a later
section). The dashed line illustrates the expected frequency under unbiased
social learning. On the right, the evolution of behavior within a population of
learners who practice positive frequency dependence depends on whether the
initial frequency of behavior is below or above one-half. Positive frequency
dependence tends to increase the more common variants and decrease the
others.
2.3 Payoff biased social learning
When individuals have information about the payoffs of others, it is pos-
sible to use these cues of success to adaptively bias social learning. Such
payoff biased, success biased, or prestige biased social learning can be very
individually adaptive, provided cues are reliable, leading to evolutionary dy-
namics that can be very similar to natural selection (Boyd and Richerson
1985, Schlag 1998, 1999, Henrich and Gil-White 2001). A key property of
these strategies may be their tendency to lead to the copying of neutral or
mildly maladaptive behavior that was initially associated with successful in-
dividuals (Boyd and Richerson 1985), but recombination is also a possibility
(Boyd and Richerson 2002).
Figure 1, bottom panel, plots the instantaneous and evolutionary dynam-
ics of simple payoff biased learning. On the left, frequency of trait after social
learning as a function of the frequency before social learning. If p is the value
on the horizontal axis, then p+p(1−p)b is the value on the vertical axis (de-
rived in McElreath and Boyd 2007, Ch 1). The parameter b determines the
strength of payoff bias and is analogous to a selection coefficient, in genetical
evolutionary theory. We plot b = 1/2 here. The dashed line is again the
expectation under unbiased social learning. On the right, the evolutionary
dynamics produce a classic logistic growth curve (solid curve). Payoff biased
social learning tends to increase the frequency of adaptive behavior, but at
the cost of greater information demands.
2.4 Integrated social learning
Many mixes of the above kinds of social learning are possible (Laland 2004,
Whiten et al. 2004). Aside from the likely possibility that individual asymmetries—
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Figure 1: Instantaneous (left plots) and evolutionary (right plots) dynamics
of frequency dependent and payoff biased social learning.
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age, sex, skill, position in social network—will make some strategies more
common among some individuals, strategies can be hierarchically ranked
within each individual. Mixes of strategies produce their own evolutionary
trajectories, as well (Henrich 2001). The dashed curve in the bottom-right
plot in Figure 1 is the dynamics of a mix of payoff bias and positive frequency
dependence. For different mixes of these and other strategies, different evo-
lutionary dynamics are expected.
2.5 Modeling integrated payoff-biased and frequency-
dependent social learning
While there has been modeling effort devoted to studying linear, unbiased
social learning, frequency dependent social learning, and payoff-biased social
learning, to our knowledge no theoretical study has simultaneously examined
these options in the same context. Therefore we finish this section by pre-
senting an extension of existing evolutionary theory that includes frequency-
dependent bias, payoff-bias, and a hierarchical integration of the two. We
construct recursions for the dynamics of genes controlling these different
learning strategies, as well as for the frequency of adaptive learned behav-
ior. We then analyze this gene-culture system in order to understand what
environments favor different strategies.
Consider a large population living in a uniform but temporally varying
environment. Each individual faces a choice of two discrete behaviors. One
of these choices yields a fitness benefit B a proportion a of the time, yielding
an average of aB. The other yields an average bB < aB. Each generation,
there is a chance u that the better behavior switches to the other option.
These changes cannot be observed by individuals.
Behavior is acquired via learning, either individual or socially. Individual
learning (I) pays an average learning cost in order to determine which option
is better. This makes the fitness of an individual learner:
W (I) = w0 + aB − c,
where w0 is baseline fitness from other behavior, and c is the average cost of
learning.
Social learning can be unbiased (linear, L), frequency dependent (con-
formist, C), payoff-biased (S), or payoff-conformity (SC). Linear social learn-
ing copies a random adult from the previous generation, resulting in average
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fitness:
W (L) = w0 + aBq + bB(1− q) = w0 +B(aq + b(1− q)).
The frequency of currently optimal behavior, q, has its own dynamics, which
we define below. The important point here is that linear social learning does
transform this proportion in any direct way. On average, it replicates the
frequency of optimal behavior across generations.
Positive frequency-dependence, conformity (C), does however transform
q. We assume perhaps the simplest conformity heuristic. The learner samples
three random adults from the previous generation and then adopts the most
common behavior among these three models. Since the chance any one model
has optimal behavior is q, the binomial distribution (see Table 1) allows us
to compute the probability of any combination and therefore the probability
the conformist learner acquires optimal behavior:
qC = q + q(1− q)(2q − 1).
Using this expression gives us a mean fitness for C:
W (C) = w0 +B(aqC + b(1− qC)).
Payoff-biased social learning (S) samples three individuals and adopts the
behavior with the highest average observed payoff. We compute the expected
probability of acquiring optimal behavior through this heuristic in the same
fashion as for conformity: each of the three models sampled has a chance
q of having optimal behavior and each model then has a chance either a or
b of displaying a payoff of B. Thus the probability of any combination of
underlying behavior and displayed payoffs can be computed from the bino-
mial distribution (Table 1). This results in a chance of acquiring optimal
behavior:
qS = q + q(1− q)(a(2 + b(2− 3b(1− q)− 4q)) + a2(3b− 1)q + b(b(1− q)− 2)).
The fitness of S is therefore:
W (S) = w0 +B(aqS + b(1− qS)).
Finally, we consider the integrated strategy payoff-conformity (SC). This
strategy attempts payoff biased social learning just as S, but falls back on
9
Table 1: Probabilities of acquiring optimal behavior via social learning, for
the three non-linear strategies positive frequency-dependence (C), payoff-
bias (S), and payoff-conformity (SC). The Sample column gives all possible
samples of three adults. Uppercase letters indicate the individual sampled
received a large (B) payoff from their behavior. Lowercase indicates the
opposite. A or a indicates optimal behavior. B or b indicates non-optimal
behavior. By multiplying each probability of a specific sample occurring by
the chance in a particular strategy column, one can sum these products to
compute an expected probability of acquiring optimal behavior via a given
strategy. In the Pr(Sample) column, q is the frequency of optimal behavior
in the entire adult population and a and b are the probabilities of optimal
and non-optimal behavior returning large payoffs.
Sample Pr(Sample) Pr(1|C) Pr(1|S) Pr(1|SC)
AAA q3 · a3 1 1 1
AAa q3 · 3a2(1− a) 1 1 1
Aaa q3 · 3a(1− a)2 1 1 1
aaa q3 · (1− a)3 1 1 1
AAB 3q2(1− q) · a2b 1 2/3 1
AAb 3q2(1− q) · a2(1− b) 1 1 1
AaB 3q2(1− q) · 2a(1− a)b 1 0 0
Aab 3q2(1− q) · 2a(1− a)(1− b) 1 1 1
aaB 3q2(1− q) · (1− a)2b 1 0 0
aab 3q2(1− q) · (1− a)2(1− b) 1 2/3 1
ABB 3q(1− q)2 · ab2 0 1/3 0
ABb 3q(1− q)2 · a2b(1− b) 0 1 1
Abb 3q(1− q)2 · a(1− b)2 0 1 1
abb 3q(1− q)2 · (1− a)(1− b)2 0 1/3 0
aBb 3q(1− q)2 · (1− a)2b(1− b) 0 0 0
aBB 3q(1− q)2 · (1− a)b2 0 0 0
BBB (1− q)3 · b3 0 0 0
BBb (1− q)3 · 3b2(1− b) 0 0 0
Bbb (1− q)3 · 3b(1− b)2 0 0 0
bbb (1− q)3 · (1− b)3 0 0 0
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positive frequency-dependence whenever observed payoffs are tied. Just as
before, it is possible to compute the expected chance of acquiring optimal
behavior through this heuristic, by using the binomial distribution (Table 1).
This gives us:
qSC = q + q(1− q)(3a(1− b2)(1− q) + 3a2bq − q(3b− 2)− 1).
Again, this implies mean fitness:
W (SC) = w0 +B(aqSC + b(1− qSC))
The dynamics of q are governed by the proportions of each strategy in
the population. For proportions fI , fL, fC , fS, fSC , the frequency of optimal
behavior in the next generation in the absence of environmental change is
given by:
q′ = fI + fLq + fCqC + fSqS + fSCqSC .
Now accounting for environmental change, we arrive at the recursion for the
frequency of optimal behavior in the next generation:
q′′ = (1− ut)q′ + ut(1− q′),
where ut ∈ [0, 1] is a random variable indicating whether the environment
changed in generation t. This random variable has chance u of being 1, as u
is the long run rate of environmental change.
The complete evolutionary system is very difficult to analyze, because
the recursion for q is highly non-linear. This means there is no guarantee
that q even reaches a stationary distribution, and so the fast-slow dynamics
approach often employed in these situations (see McElreath and Boyd 2007,
Chapter 6) is risky. Even if we adopt the fast-slow approach, the implied
equilibrium of q is itself the solution to a cubic in q and very difficult to
analyze.
Therefore we adopt a simple simulation approach to analyzing this sys-
tem. We conduct simulations for a large number of parameter combinations
in order to map out the conditions that favor different strategies. The fitness
expressions and the recursion for q allow us to define a set of difference equa-
tions that define the evolutionary dynamics of the system. For any initial
frequencies of the strategies and values for w0, B, c, a, b, u, simulating this
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system amounts to generating a random variable ut and recursively comput-
ing the frequencies of each strategy after selection. After 5000 simulated
generations at each parameter combination, we record the frequency of each
strategy. While frequencies could in principle be highly stochastic, fluctuat-
ing as selection fluctuates, the results show that taking the final frequency
delivers the correct inferences. It also turns out that initial frequencies have
no effect on the long run evolution of the system, allowing us to present
simulation results for uniform initial conditions in which all strategies had
initially equal frequency.
Figure 2 plots the frequencies of each strategy at simulation end, for two-
dimensional sensitivity analyses. Black indicates a frequency of 1. White
indicates a frequency of 0. Grays indicate intermediate frequencies, on a
linear gradient. Baseline parameter values in these simulations were B/c =
6, u = 0.1, a = 3/4, b = 1/4, w0 = 2. In the top row, the horizontal axis
takes b, the rate of good payoffs from the non-optimal choice, from 0 to 0.5,
holding the value of a = 0.5 + b. Thus the degree to which the optimal
choice is better remains constant, but the absolute level of profitability of
both options increase, as one moves left-to-right on the horizontal axis. The
vertical axis takes u, the rate of environmental change, from 0 to 0.6, moving
top-to-bottom.
When u is large, the environment changes rapidly, and individual learn-
ing excludes the other strategies (top-left plot, Figure 2). When the environ-
ment is sufficiently stable, however, either payoff-biased social learning (S) or
payoff-conformity social learning (SC) excludes the other strategies. When b
is small, S excludes SC.
The second row varies the difference between the optimal and non-optimal
option, a−b, from 0 to 0.5, on the vertical axis. The difference in profitability
between the two options interacts only very weakly with the absolute level
of profitability, shown again on the horizontal axis. At the extreme limit of
a − b = 0, learning doesn’t pay at all, and so all strategies remain at their
initial frequencies (the gray line at the top of the plots in the second row),
except for individual learning (I), which is eliminated for trying to learn and
paying a direct cost to do so.
The third row of simulations interacts environmental uncertainty, u, with
the magnitude of payoffs, B. The vertical axis is identical to that of the
first row, but the horizontal varies B from 2 to 10 (centered on the value
B = 6 that generated the other rows). We can see now that, when B is
sufficiently small, individual learning is always excluded, even when the envi-
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Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis for the evolutionary model of social learn-
ing strategies in the main text. Each row plots the frequencies of five
different strategies (individual learning, unbiased social learning, positive
frequency-dependence, payoff bias, and payoff-conformity, respectively) for
two-dimensional combinations of parameters. Each individual plot is the
frequency of a single strategy after 5000 generations of simulations at all
combinations of the two parameters labeled on each axis. First row: u
varied from 0 to 0.5, b varied from 0 to 0.5, while a = 0.5 + b. Second
row: a− b varied from 0 to 0.5, b again from 0 to 0.5. Third row: u again
from 0 to 0.5, B from 2 to 10. All other parameters not on axes were fixed
at B/c = 6, u = 0.1, a = 3/4, b = 1/4, w0 = 2. The most pwerful inference
from these simulations is that either payoff-bias (S) or payoff-conformity (SC)
dominates the population, unless the environment is very unstable and indi-
vidual learning is too costly, relative to fitness benefits of optimal behavior.
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ronment is highly unstable. Payoff biased social learning, however, excludes
the other strategies for these parameter combinations. Payoff-conformity
only dominates, as the environment becomes more stable. This stands to
reason, as conformity—combined with payoff bias or not—suffers more from
changes in the environment than does pure payoff bias. To understand this,
consider what happens to a conformist just after a change in the environ-
ment. Chances are, majority behavior is sub-optimal, and therefore confor-
mity tends to reduce the frequency of optimal behavior even more. Payoff
bias, however, can still use payoffs as a cue to optimality.
2.6 Analysis summary
The most obvious result of this analysis is to emphasize the adaptive sig-
nificance of payoff biased social learning, whether combined with frequency-
dependence or not. Provided payoffs can be observed with sufficient accuracy,
adopting behavioral options with higher observed average payoffs excludes
other strategies under a wide range of conditions. Unless the environment
is extremely stochastic (in which case individual learning dominates) or al-
most perfectly stable (in which case pure conformity dominates), some kind
of payoff biased learning is an ESS, in our simulations.
The integrated social learning strategy, payoff-conformity, excludes pure
payoff bias when the environment is not too unstable. Being partly frequency-
dependent, it needs the optimal behavior to be the more common behavior,
at least long enough to realize fitness gains. Otherwise, ignoring frequency
information is more adaptive. The other factor affecting whether payoff-
conformity dominates pure payoff bias appears to be the magnitudes of a
and b, the chances optimal and non-options behavior yield large payoffs. In
the simulations, when a > 1/2, the integrated payoff-conformity strategy
outperforms payoff bias alone, holding the difference a− b constant. We are
unsure what is causing this advantage. The expression qSC > qS can be
reduced, but it yields a complicated expression that is difficult to interpret.
It is also not the whole story, because the average value of q is not described
by this condition, and a and b will have large effects on this value.
An interesting feature of payoff biased strategies is that they can eliminate
individual learning, because any variation among individuals in choice can be
used to discriminate good and bad options by payoffs. All of the non-linear
social learning strategies—positive frequency-dependence, payoff bias, and
payoff-conformity—can in fact do this, because their non-linear effects can,
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under the right conditions, accomplish the same thing as individual learning.
In the next section, we present an experimental design that allows for a
large number of different and integrated social learning strategies. In light of
these simulations, we expect a heavy reliance on payoff bias. Also, because
the environment is quite stable in the experiment (changing every 15 periods,
or a rate of 0.07), the integrated payoff-conformity strategy should exclude
pure payoff-bias. We do not think these exact predictions will describe the
results—even simple experiments are much more complex than the theory
that motivates them. However, if the theory we have presented here gets at
the right economic considerations, then the qualitative results should show
a much stronger reliance on payoff bias than frequency bias.
3 Experimental Design
In order to study the diversity of social learning strategies, we require a
decision context complex enough to make both frequency dependence and
payoff bias simultaneously possible. Our social learning experiments create
social contexts in which groups of individuals can evolve behavioral tradi-
tions, through a combination of their own experience and the available social
information. These “micro-society” (Baum et al. 2004, Schotter and Sopher
2003) experiments are highly controlled, relative to field studies of social
learning, and as a result, we know which social and individual information
each participant examines at each time step. Unlike most experiments, how-
ever, our experimental groups generate all social information endogenously,
without any experimenter deception. This both allows us to examine the
emergent properties of social learning and develop statistical methods that
can address less-controlled natural sources of data.
The experiment allows participants to access both the frequencies of dif-
ferent choices and associated payoffs, within their own social groups. Over
a series of rounds, they may or may not use this information to learn, and
we use the complete time series of decisions and records of which partici-
pants access which information in order to test the different models of social
learning, payoff-biased or frequency-biased.
We have used a similar social decision environment in previous work
(McElreath et al. 2005), and the environment itself is a social-learning exten-
sion of familiar multi-arm bandits used in diverse fields to study individual
learning. By using a well-studied decision environment, we can begin with
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good candidate individual learning models and study the effects of adding
different kinds of social information. Our previous experimental studies have
omitted payoff information, and so we could not consider payoff-biased strate-
gies. And while we have used the statistical approach in our previous papers,
we have not previously emphasized the methodological value of the statistics
themselves, for analyzing data collected in “wild” contexts.
3.1 Participants
163 participants, students at the University of California at Davis, interacted
with one another via a computer network. We recruited participants through
an advertisement in the campus newspaper. Participants received between
$5 and $20 for their participation, based upon their performance. We used no
deception in this experiment. Participants read a complete set of instructions
and successfully completed a set of test questions about their knowledge of
the experiment, before beginning.
3.2 Group structure
Participants were sorted into random, anonymous groups of 4-7 individu-
als, in sessions of between 8 and 20 participants. Each session was a single
experiment on a single date. While participants in the same session made
choices in the same room, these participants did not know which of the other
participants they were sorted into a group with. Groups were constrained
to always be greater than 3 individuals, in order for frequency bias to be
effective, as 3 neighbors is the minimum required for positive frequency de-
pendence. Depending upon the total number of participants showing up for
a given session, group sizes were arranged to create as many groups of 4 as
possible. All remaining participants in that session were placed in a single
larger group.
3.3 Decision
Over a series of 60 periods, “seasons,” each participant made a series of 60
crop choice decisions. These 60 periods were divided into 4 “farms” of 15
periods each. These farms served to signal to participants that conditions
might have changed. On any given farm, one of two crops, “wheat” or
“potatoes,” had a higher average yield than the other. Across farms, which
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crop was optimal was determined at random. Thus in each period, each
participant chose a single crop to plant and receive a yield from. Yields were
summed across all periods, and participants received cash payment so that
they earned between $5 and $20, depending upon performance. The vast
majority of participants earned between $15 and $18.
The number of farms and periods in each finesses the tradeoffs of (1)
having only limited time to keep participants before they grow bored and
unmotivated and (2) desiring the most varied data on learning. Thus the total
number of periods, 4×15, is set by the time constraint. The number of periods
per farm is set to maximize information about learning dynamics. If we had a
single farm of 60 periods, most of the later periods would add little to nothing
to the analysis, because all participants would be sure of the best option by
then, as we have learned from previous experiments (McElreath et al. 2005).
If a farm is too short, however, we never witness the full dynamics of any
learning process. Therefore, guided by pilot experiments and our simulation
studies, we decided on 15 periods per farm, as this is the approximate value
that maximized our ability to correctly distinguish simulated strategies.
3.4 Social information
On the first period of each farm, no social information was available. How-
ever, on each period after the first, participants could access social informa-
tion from the most recent period. Participants could examine their own most
recent crop choices and resulting yields. Each participant could also examine
the most recent crop choices and yields of each member of their own group.
This information was displayed on screen in boxes labeled by the type of
information. When a participant moused over a box, the information in it
was displayed. The experiment software tracked millisecond access to this
information, resulting in a time series of information access. This kind of
“mouse-tracking” experiment has been used to great effect in judgment and
decision-making research (Payne et al. 1993). The order of the rows, yield
and crop, was randomized for each participant, each period, and the order of
neighbors was also randomized. The order of the crop choices at the bottom
was also randomized within each participant and period.
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3.5 Payoffs
Both crops generated payoffs from normal distributions with the same vari-
ance, while the better crop had a mean payoff of 13 units and the worse
10 units (set from previous experience and simulation study). Participants
knew that one crop had a constant higher mean than the other, but had no
prior information that would allow them to determine which of the two was
better.
The variance of yields was constant within farms but could be either 1/2
or 4, determined randomly but in a way to ensure 2 farms with a variance
of 1/2 and 2 farms with a variance of 4. The different variances comprise
a learning difficulty treatment that we have used in previous experiments
(McElreath et al. 2005).
3.6 Simulating the experiment
While there is not space here to describe our simulation in detail, we used
the statistical models we will present later to produce simulated experimental
play, under a variety of group sizes and other experiment parameters. These
simulations simply use the probability models to produce stochastic learning
and choice. We then run the data produced through the exact statistical
analysis we use on the real data. These simulations allowed us to (1) choose
good experimental design parameters and (2) verify that our statistical anal-
ysis works (i.e. recovers true simulated strategies).
4 Results
Like our previous experiments (Efferson et al. 2007, McElreath et al. 2005),
participants learn the optimal crop for each farm, over time. Figure 3 shows
the proportion of participants making optimal choices, as a function of pe-
riod within each farm. The rate of improvement is much faster than in previ-
ous experiments, which omitted payoff information for neighbors (McElreath
et al. 2005). The increase between periods 2 and 15 is much smaller than the
increase between periods 1 and 2.
Perhaps as a result of the marginal gains in optimality declining after
the second period, rates of inspecting the choices (which crop was planted)
and yields (how much profit was made last period) of neighbors decline from
the second period onward (Figure 3). The average rate never falls below a
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Figure 3: Left plot: Proportion of optimal crop decisions, by round within
farm. Vertical lines show 95% profile likelihood confidence intervals. Right
plot: Proportion of nighbors’ crop decisions (circles) and yields (line) in-
spected, by round within farm.
majority of neighbors, however. Note that rates of inspecting yields slightly
exceed those for inspecting crop choices. This implies that some participants
were using something similar to an elimination by aspects strategy, in which
one important cue is used to first narrow down the number of cases one will
consider (see Payne et al. 1993). In this case, some participants may have
first eliminated neighbors to examine crop choices from, by first scanning the
yields from the previous period. This would result in the kind of pattern
seen in Figure 3, right panel. Our statistical analyses in the next section use
only the yields and crops actually inspected by each participant, and so take
the search strategy as a given. We think the design of the search strategy is
a worthwhile question, however. But we doubt such details—truly observing
information search—will often be possible in natural settings.
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5 Analysis
We adopt a statistical approach that allows us to (1) directly use mathemat-
ical models of social learning strategies as statistical models and (2) evaluate
several plausible, non-null statistical models simultaneously. The question
is not whether social information is used—few would expect a complete ab-
sence of social learning in such a context—but rather how social information
is used.
5.1 Strategies
We translate each hypothetical learning strategy into an expression that
yields the conditional probability of an individual choosing any behavioral
option i in any period t, given private information and the social informa-
tion the individual accessed. Each strategy consists of two parts. The first
part is the definition of a recursion for updating the attraction scores of all
behavioral options. The second part is a convex combination of individual
choice and the influence of social information.
A large number of meaningfully different strategies can be constructed
by varying these two components (Camerer 2003, Camerer and Ho 1999,
Stahl 2000). As our purpose in this paper is to illustrate the approach in
the simplest manner, we do not explore a large strategy space, but instead
restrict ourselves to those nominated by the basic research question and
existing evolutionary literature: how do people use frequency-dependent and
payoff-biased social learning, when both are possible?
We examine five different models that combine elements of frequency de-
pendence and/or payoff-bias. First, we define (1) individual learning, (2)
frequency dependent social learning, (3) payoff-biased social learning. We
then define hierarchical strategies that combine payoff-biased learning with
the frequency dependence or individual learning: (4) hierarchical compare
means and individual learning, and (5) hierarchical compare means and fre-
quency dependence. We do not present analyses of strategies that reverse
the hierarchical order of information use, frequency dependence and compare
means, for example. These strategies fit very poorly to our data, as will be-
come clear when we examine the fits of each basic model, and so we omit
them for simplicity of presentation.
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(1) Individual learning. We use a standard, successful reinforcement
learning model as the basis of individual updating (Camerer 2003, Chap-
ter 6). The attraction score of option i in period t+ 1 is given by:
Ai,t+1 = (1− φ)Ai,t + φpii,t,
where φ is a parameter determining the weight given to new experience and
pii,t is the payoff observed for option i in period t. When option i was not
sampled in period t, pii,t = 0. Since there is no reason to expect participants to
have strong priors favoring either behavioral option, we set A1,0 = A2,0 = 0.
The attraction scores are transformed into probabilistic choice with a
“soft-max” choice rule, again typical of the learning in games literature. The
probability of choosing option i in period t+ 1 is given by:
Pr(i|At,Θ)t+1 = exp(λAi,t)
exp(λA1,t) + exp(λA2,t)
,
where Θ indicates a vector of all parameters, and λ is a parameter that
measures the influence of differences between attraction scores on choice.
When λ = 0, choice is random with respect to attraction scores. As λ→∞,
choice becomes deterministic, in favor of the option with the higher attraction
score.
(2) Frequency dependent social learning. To model the family of
strategies that use the frequency of behavior among group members, we
modify the learning model above to cue choice by the frequency of options
seen. Attractions are updated as before, but choice is given by the rule:
Pr(i|At,Θ)t+1 = (1− γ) exp(λAi,t)
exp(λA1,t) + exp(λA2,t)
+ γ
nfi,t
nf1,t + n
f
2,t
,
where ni,t is the count of neighbors observed to have chosen option i in period
t, γ measures the weight of social information on choice, and f determines
how non-linear frequency dependence is. When f = 1, imitation is unbiased.
When f > 1, however, more common options have exaggerated chances of
being copied, resulting in positive frequency dependence, such as majority
rule conformity. When f < 1, frequency dependence is negative, and more
commonly observed options are less likely to be copied.
Since changes in choice feedback to changes in attraction scores, even
though this strategy has the same attraction updating recursion as individual
learning, reinforcement patterns may be quite different.
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(3) Compare means. This payoff-biased strategy attends to neighbors’
yields and chooses the option with the highest observed mean. It uses the
choice rule:
Pr(i|At,Θ)t+1 = (1− γ) exp(λAi,t)
exp(λA1,t) + exp(λA2,t)
+ γ
p¯i100i,t
p¯i1001,t + p¯i
100
2,t
,
where p¯ii,t =
∑
j pii,j,t/ni,t is the mean payoff observed for option i in period
t over all group members j, including oneself. Raising these average payoffs
to a large power creates an approximate step function, so that one or the
other option is favored by the social component of choice. When one or
both options are unobserved in period t, this strategy behaves as individual
learning. We fix f = 100 in order to force the model to match our theory,
i.e. a threshold behavior.
(4) Hierarchical compare means/individual learning. This strategy
uses the comparison of choice means and individual updating, but in a man-
ner different than the pure Compare means model. Using the distance be-
tween estimated means as a cue of uncertainty, the strategy falls back on
individual learning (attraction updating) when the means are similar. We
use a symmetrical logistic function to model the change in reliance on payoffs,
as the distance between the observed means increases. Let Y (δ, p¯i1,t, p¯i2,t) be
the proportion of choice that is driven by individual updating, where δ is a
new parameter that determines how quickly reliance on payoffs decreases, as
the difference in observed means increases.
Y (δ, p¯i1,t, p¯i2,t) =
2
1 + exp(δ(p¯i1,t − p¯i2,t)2) ≡ Y.
Figure 4 plots this function for two values of δ. The probability of choosing
i under the hierarchical means/individual strategy is:
Pr(i|At,Θ)t+1 = (1− γ) exp(λAi,t)
exp(λA1,t) + exp(λA2,t)
+ γ
(
(1− Y ) p¯i
100
i,t
p¯i1001,t + p¯i
100
2,t
+ Y
exp(λAi,t)
exp(λA1,t) + exp(λA2,t)
)
.
For similar observed means, the individual learning component will dominate
the social learning term. Otherwise, the individual will mainly attend to
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Figure 4: The function that determines the reliance on payoff-biased learn-
ing, as a function of the observed difference in means, p¯i1,t − p¯i2,t. See the
description of the Hierarchical Means/Conformity strategy in the text. Solid
curve: δ = 1/10. Dashed curve: δ = 2.
differences in observed means. However, if δ is a very large number, then
only a very narrow range of very similar observed means will lead to falling
back on individual updating.
(5) Hierarchical compare means/frequency dependent social learn-
ing. This model is like the previous, but falls back on frequency dependent
social learning, as the difference in observed means increases.
Pr(i|At,Θ)t+1 = (1− γ) exp(λAi,t)
exp(λA1,t) + exp(λA2,t)
+ γ
(
(1− Y ) p¯i
100
i,t
p¯i1001,t + p¯i
100
2,t
+ Y
nfi,t
nf1,t + n
f
2,t
)
.
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5.2 Fitting strategies to data
The 19 experiment sessions involving 163 participants provided 7,900 deci-
sions, under full information conditions that might allow us to distinguish
between frequency-dependent and payoff-biased social learning. We fit the
above models to these decisions, producing for each model a negative log-
likelihood of observing the true data, given the assumption that the model
is true: − logL(D|x,Θ) for a model x with set of parameters Θ, where D is
the data, a vector of “crop” choices. The likelihood is defined as:
L(D|x,Θ) =
∏
t
Pr(Dj|At−1,Θ)t,
where
∏
t indicates the product over all rows t. The usual practice in likeli-
hood estimation, and the practice we follow here, is to take natural logs of
each conditional probability and then sum these to find logL(D|x,P):
− logL(D|x,Θ) = −
∑
t
log Pr(Dj|At−1,Θ)t.
Taking logs first results in greater precision, because of the way most com-
puters handle floating point values. The parameters Θ are fit via maximum
likelihood, and therefore the fitting exercise also yields information on the
best estimates of flexible components of the learning rules.
We conducted this fitting exercise, as well as the validating simulations,
in R and using the helpful package bbmle (R Development Core Team 2008,
Bolker and based on stats4 by the R Development Core Team 2008). All
analysis code is available from the corresponding author. We confirmed via
simulation that our analysis could recover true parameter values and strate-
gies, when the true strategy was among the set of strategies considered. The
validation exercise is helpful, because not all distinct models can be distin-
guished by all kinds of data (this problem has plagued the individual learning
literature, see Camerer 2003, Chapter 6).
5.3 Comparing models
We compare the fit of the social learning models using Akaike Information
Criteria (Akaike 1974, Burnham and Anderson 2002). Unlike null-hypothesis
testing, comparing models with Akaike Information Criteria (AIC—called
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by Akaike himself simply “An Information Criterion,” but subsequently re-
named by the scientific community), or another information criterion, allows
a researcher to assess the relative explanatory power of any number of dif-
ferent competing and plausible models, without favoring any “null” model.
AIC is an estimate of the information lost by using any particular model to
estimate reality.
The advantages of the information theoretic approach over customary
null-hypothesis testing has been discussed for several decades (see citations in
Cohen 1994, Anderson et al. 2000), so we will not repeat them here. Readers
should note, however, that there will be no p-values in our presentation.
Like many statisticians, we do not find much inferential value in p-values,
especially when multiple plausible models are under consideration. AIC and
related approaches are becoming increasingly popular in the evolutionary
sciences, because they permit more nuanced questions and are not plagued by
the same sample size biases of null-hypothesis testing (Johnson and Omland
2003). They also allow for more powerful analysis of observational data,
collected without precise experimental control.
In order to compare the models, each negative log-likelihood from the
fitting exercise is transformed into an Akaike Information Criterion (AIC):
AICx = −2 logL(D|x,P) + 2k,
where k is the number of free parameters in model x. We use the common
sample-size adjusted version of the above, AICc (Burnham and Anderson
2002), and this what we display in our results:
AICc,x = −2 logL(D|x,P) + 2k + 2k(k + 1)
n− k − 1 ,
where n is the number of observations to be predicted by the model. The
penalty for number of parameters is not arbitrary—it adjusts precisely for
the expected overfitting that arises whenever free parameters are added.
AIC can be used to select a single “best” model, if an analyst desires.
However, since the “true” model, in all its detail, is certainly not contained
in the set of models fit to data, it is perhaps a more productive approach is to
treat it as a continuous measure of the degree to which each model estimates
“truth” (Forster and Sober 1994). AIC estimates the out-of-sample predictive
accuracy of each model, and one easy way of ranking these estimates relative
to the models in the analysis is by using Akaike weights (Burnham and
25
Anderson 2002). The weight of any model x is given by:
wx =
exp(−1
2
∆x)∑
j exp(−12∆j)
,
where ∆x = AICx −AICmin, the difference between the AIC of model x and
the smallest AIC in the set of compared models. For the best-fitting model
with the smallest AIC, ∆ = 0. These weights are numbers between zero and
one that estimate the relative likelihoods of each model being the best model
in the set.
A useful way we have found to explain this approach is to consider a
horse race. There are many horses in each race, and while the fastest horse
will not always win, it usually will. If the best horse loses, it should not
usually lose by much. Thus both the rank of finishes—which horse was first,
second, etc.—and the time differences in finishes are informative. In the same
way, the true model may not always fit the data best (just as “significant”
p-values do not always identify important effects). But it will usually have a
high Akaike weight, even if not the highest. So just as a photo finish tells you
that it is difficult to say, without another race, which of two horses is faster,
when two models have very similar Akaike weights, there is uncertainty as to
which would make the best out-of-sample predictions. When one model has
an Akaike weight much larger than the others, however, we can be confident
that it is the best of the models considered.
Table 2 presents the AICc, Akaike weight, and parameter estimates for
each model, sorted from best to worst fitting model. The bulk of evidence
favors model 5, hierarchical compare means/frequency dependence. While
there is no doubt heterogeneity among participants, the strength of this result
leaves little doubt that any of the simpler strategies accounts for any sizable
fraction of participants. The maximum likelihood estimate for f , the degree
of positive or negative frequency dependence, is just under 2, indicating mild
positive frequency dependence or conformity (Figure 5). The maximum like-
lihood estimate of δ (not shown in figure) produces a steep fall-off in reliance
on payoff bias for a distance above about 1 unit. We caution that there is
uncertainty in these estimates, but emphasize that a model with δ fixed to
a large value, say 100, does not produce a better fit, even accounting for the
reduction of one parameter.
Many readers may wonder what proportion of variance in choice is ex-
plained by the best-fitting model. As is usual with binomial models, there
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Table 2: Comparison of social learning models fit to experimental data. AICc
indicates the adjusted fit of each model to the entire sequence of choices, for
each subject, after accounting for model complexity (number of parameters).
Models are ordered from best fit to worst. The Akaike weights estimate
the proportion of evidence in favor of each model. Meanings of parameters:
φ ∈ [0, 1], strength of attraction updating; λ > 0, influence of attraction
differences of choice; γ ∈ [0, 1], weight given to social information; δ > 0,
decline in probability of payoff-biased imitation, as difference in observed
means increases.
Parameter estimates
Model AICc Akaike weight φ λ γ δ f
HCMFD 6519.59 ≈ 1 0.6605 0.1645 0.3365 3.210 1.953
HCMINDIV 6918.89 < 0.001 0.4620 0.1917 0.1400 4.982 NA
Compare means 6924.23 < 0.001 0.4611 0.1921 0.1239 NA NA
Freq depend 6929.34 < 0.001 0.4998 0.1814 0.1349 NA 3.396
Individual 7004.25 < 0.001 0.4382 0.1866 NA NA NA
HCMFD: Hierarchical compare means/frequency dependence.
HCMINDIV: Hierarchical compare means/individual learning.
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Figure 5: Maximum likelihood estimate of strength of positive frequency
dependence for the best-fitting model, hierarchical compare means/frequency
dependence. Solid line: estimated probability of copying a choice, given its
frequency in the group. Dashed line: same probability under f = 1, unbiased
social learning.
is no true equivalent of R2, the proportion of variation explained by the fit
model. However, it is possible to construct an analogue that compares the
raw likelihoods of each model to a random choice model. A random choice
model just chooses randomly at each time t. Over 7,900 choices, this model
will always have a negative log-likelihood of −7900 × log(1/2) = 5475.863.
This is a reasonable benchmark for the worst any model can do, predicting
the data. The negative log-likelihood of the best-fitting model is 3259.792.
Therefore an analogous calculation of the variance explained by any model x
is 1− log(L(D|x))/ log(L(D|random)). In our case, 1−3259.792/5475.863 =
0.4047. For the second-best model, 1 − 3459.442/5475.863 = 0.3682. These
measures do not account for model complexity, but they do provide a rough
guide to additional raw variance explained by the best model. We caution,
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however, that substantial components of choice may be truly random, and
therefore any behavioral model will fail to achieve a negative log-likelihood
of zero. In cases in which measurement error is possible, as in field studies
or data coded from video, measurement error will also make it impossible for
even the true model to achieve a negative log-likelihood near zero.
6 Discussion
We have analyzed an interdependent time series of profit-oriented choice
behavior in humans. Our experiment did not precisely control the social in-
formation available to each participant. Instead, we allowed all social infor-
mation to arise endogenously, through the actual behavior and information-
seeking of participants. While one major tradition in laboratory experiments
frowns upon such a design, we consider it an asset, for two reasons.
First, if the study of social learning is ever to link the psychological to the
population level, statistical techniques that can accommodate observational
and noisy data are needed. The model comparison approach we adopt in this
paper is general to any set of strategies a researcher might imagine. Caution
is needed to ensure that the kind of data available can discriminate among
the possible models. But provided the different models are identifiable in
this way, the likelihood-based information criteria can quantify the relative
explanatory power of different hypotheses. These dynamic models can then
be reasonably asked to produce out-of-system predictions that provide an-
other avenue of disconfirmation. In contrast, effect sizes from ANOVA can
not reasonably be expected to predict out-of-experiment effects, because no
genuine model of learning is present.
Second, the emergent population-level consequences of social learning can
only be studied where the experimenter allows them to occur—in settings in
which social information itself is not controlled experimentally. This advan-
tage is two-fold. Being able to study population-level effects, such as the
emergence of traditions or rates of diffusion, is important. But in a cultural
species, such as humans and possibly other species, social learning strategies
themselves are likely adapted to a cultural environment (Henrich and McEl-
reath 2007). Thus it will eventually be difficult to study the functional design
of strategic social learning without appreciating the cultural environment it
is adapted to. This will be true even (especially) if learning strategies them-
selves are culturally transmitted, because the population will exert downward
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causation on individuals’ learning strategies.
The major scientific finding of our analysis of the experiment is that
our human participants relied heavily on payoff biased social learning, as
predicted by the evolutionary model. We think predictions generated by an
economic, rather than evolutionary model, would make similar predictions,
provided social information was endogenous to the model. When there is
no additional cost to access payoffs and the information is subject to no
error, as in this experiment, then it is no surprise perhaps that a successful
strategy will attend to payoffs. What might be more counter intuitive is the
hierarchical combination of payoff bias and frequency bias. The evidence
strongly suggests that our participants used a strategy akin to: (1) Are the
two choices’ payoffs similar on average? (2) If yes, which is more common?
(3) If no, which has the higher average payoff?
It also worth noting that participants did not require any training time
to learn to attend strongly to payoffs—they did so from the first period so-
cial information was present. We make no strong claims about the source
of these strategies. Social learning strategies may of course themselves be
learned socially, and we have wondered about the effects of this in previous
experiments (McElreath et al. 2005). Indeed, there is likely hidden strategic
variation among participants. Our analysis approach, fitting a single model
at a time to the entire set of data, is a common approach, because rarely do
we have enough data on each participant to reliably distinguish differences
in strategy. However, in principle, the statistical methods here do not re-
quire one to conduct the analysis this way. Each participant can be analyzed
separately, or a series of fixed effects parameters can be used to statistically
model individual differences. In the analysis here, the overwhelming support
of the best model implies little strategic variation that could be detected
by the considered models. However, we do not think this means all partici-
pants used the same strategy, merely that we have not modeled the kind of
differences that exist.
A common reaction, both by ourselves and our colleagues, to experiments
with students is to be skeptical of the generality of the results. True, univer-
sity students are a special population that is likely not typical of the human
species. However, no single population will likely be representative of the
human species. That is, every culture and sub-culture may be a special case.
We think there are serious limits to how much we can generalize from exper-
iments with students. But we also think that being able to explain learning
in any case is an advance. Just as studying the evolution of beetle larva in
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the lab does not tell us exactly how evolution works in any other species (or
even in wild beetles), the clarity of the results does generate insights than can
transfer across cases. Our feeling is that no one should conclude the human
species is just like university students, anymore than one should conclude all
insects have the evolutionary dynamics of flour beetles. But nor should one
ignore flour beetles, as if their evolution is not worth explaining. University
students are real people with real learning strategies, and being able to model
this learning is worthwhile.
It is always possible that another, unconsidered, strategy is a better de-
scription of the social learning process. The same weakness is common to all
analytical approaches, however, and we caution readers not to consider this
a flaw special to the information criterion and model comparison approach.
But despite the strong weight of evidence for this strategy here, we think
there is no substitute for replication and the variation of experimental de-
sign in order to test the robustness of a result. Both our experiments and
theoretical analysis are special, like all experiments and models. Whatever
the source of social learning strategies—cultural or genetic or (likely) both—
the strategies we find in our experiments certainly did not evolve in the lab.
And however useful simple evolutionary models are for exploring the logic of
population dynamics, they cannot and do not attempt to replicate reality.
We have emphasized the generality of the statistical approach, as it is not
tied to any particular experiment or set of predictions, but it is worth noting
key assumptions of both the experiments and models.
First, the experimental environment we have used provides highly accu-
rate (noise free) payoff information, whereas real social environments cer-
tainly do not. In addition, real social environments may provide cues of suc-
cess, but these cues will often be integrations of the contributions of many
separate behaviors. For example, if someone in your town is healthy, is it a
result of her diet, her religion, or her close bonds with kin? This integrated
nature of cues of success means that people may copy many traits from
successful or prestigious individuals, with potentially important effects on
cultural dynamics (Boyd and Richerson 1985, Henrich and Gil-White 2001).
Relevant to our experimental results and the prediction of the model that
payoff-bias would dominate, it may be that the clear advantage of payoff-
bias depends upon the ability to know that any cue of success arises from
a particular behavior. If not, other forms of social learning may be more
competitive. Some of our ongoing experiments explore this consideration.
Second, our evolutionary analysis built upon a number of existing models
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of the evolution of social learning (Boyd and Richerson 1988, 1995, 1996,
Rogers 1988, McElreath and Strimling 2008). By doing so, it is comparable
to these models, but also considers a fairly special life history. In all of these
models, generations are barely overlapping: adults survive only long enough
to be imitated. Grandparents never survive to be imitated. There is no
population structure, including within the biological family, and therefore
any effects of gene-culture covariation are ignored (see however McElreath
and Strimling 2008). While this kind of model provides perhaps the purest
evaluation of the logic and economics of social learning strategies, actual
strategies may have evolved (culturally or genetically) under rather special
conditions or in order to exploit overlapping generations. If so, the inferences
derived from these models will be misleading. How they will be misleading is
hard to say, until more social learning theory exploring population structure
and overlapping generations appears.
This lacuna of theory aside, the existing evolutionary literature is suffi-
cient to motivate the search for positive frequency dependence and kinds of
payoff bias in other apes, if not crows, whales and rats. In the search for the
psychological differences that make human cultural evolution qualitatively
different from that of other animals, the existence of frequency dependent
and refined payoff bias is often ignored. For example, experiments in which
apes see three ape demonstrators access food through a two-action problem,
with two demonstrators performing one action and the third another, will
produce data that can estimate the magnitude of positive frequency depen-
dence.
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